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Abstract
The $-Game was recently introduced as an extension of the Minority Game. In this
paper we compare this model with the well know Minority Game and the Majority
Game models. Due to the inter-temporal nature of the market payoff, we introduce
a two step transaction with single and mixed group of interacting traders. When
the population is composed of two different group of $-traders, they show an anti-
imitative behavior. However, when they interact with minority or majority players
the $-population imitates the usual behavior of these players. Finally we discuss
how these models contribute to clarify the market mechanism.
Key words: $-Game, Minority Game, Majority Game, Round-trip transaction and
Mixed Models.
PACS: 02.50.le, 87.23.ge, 89.65.s
1 Introduction
The Minority Game (MG) [1]has addressed many issues to understand com-
plex systems with special emphasis on modelling market mechanism. Although
the Minority Game is a very simple model, it contains the main ingredients
to reproduce a rich behavior such as that observed in financial market [2].
These features arise from relatively simple rules used to define the interaction
of agents. In particular the MG assumes that market interaction is such that
it pays to be in the minority. This assumption was recently challenged by An-
dersen and Sornette [3] who derived a different market payoff considering the
profits of round-trip transactions (buy/sell or sell/buy). A round-trip requires
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at least 2 transactions and hence the market payoff depends on the price at
two different times, i.e. on the action of traders at different times. The traders
in the model introduced by Andersen and Sornette, called $-Game model, use
this market payoff to judge the performance of their strategies. This leads to
a market behavior which is very different from that of the Minority Game. In
particular traders using the correct market payoff are found to perform bet-
ter than those who base their behavior on the MG payoff. This models was
analyzed also by Jefferies and Johnson [4,5], that discuss different aspects of
market models.
A key observation is that, in the $-game the real market payoff is assessed on
the basis of virtual trading: round trip transactions are used to evaluate trad-
ing strategy, but they are not actually implemented by traders. For example,
if an agent bought some shares of asset at time t− 1, she/he will consider the
virtual payoff of selling these shares at the current price at time t, without
actually selling it. Using virtual trades to asses market payoff might be a real-
istic behavioral assumption. Irrespective of this, a key issue is to understand
what are the consequences of this assumption on the collective behavior of
the market. More precisely, how does market’s behavior differs if agents use
virtual or real trades to asses market payoffs?
The na¨ıve arguments which suggests that the difference is very small, contends
that prices depend very weakly on a particular trader’s transaction. Whether
a transaction was really carried out or not should not affect much the ag-
gregate behavior. These type of arguments are known to be problematic in
heterogeneous agent market models, and indeed fail both in the majority [11]
and in the minority game [12] as well as in other asset market models [13]. In
other words, while the impact of each trader may be small on the aggregate,
the effect of all traders neglecting their impact can be dramatic.
We shall come to a quite similar conclusion, namely that virtual or real trading
makes a difference in market’s behavior. More precisely, we show that when
agents use round-trip transactions both in the definition of market payoff and
in their actual behavior we recover a behavior which is similar to that of
the MG. Indeed round-trip transactions induces anti-correlations in market
returns and Ref. [6] show that market payoff reduces to those assumed in the
MG when the market returns are anti-correlated.
In order to do this we need to introduce slightly more complex models based
on two times: decision making consists on a round-trip action where the agents
decide to buy or sell at time t and do the opposite (sell or buy) at time t+ 1,
then they evaluate the result in the next time step. In addition to this we also
aim to studying the interaction between different types of traders, using the
minority, majority or $-Game payoff.
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The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we derived the market payoff
following Ref. [3,6] and we discuss the key observable. Then we analyze single
time models in section 3 and then we move to two times models in section 4.
Homogeneous populations and mixed populations are studied. Finally we give
some concluding remarks in section 5.
2 Market Payoff
Now we will derive the minority and the majority mechanism from the mar-
ket’s dynamics. A single step in the Minority Game model could be split in
three stages. First of all, at time t− ǫ the agent submits an order ai(t) = ±1
(buy or sell) that is going to be useful in computing the aggregate value
A(t) =
∑
i ai(t), at time t. At time t + ǫ the agents update their experience
simply by evaluating the success of their action. Focusing on one agent i, we
can assert that if ai(t) = 1 he/she contributes with 1$ to the market demand
and if ai(t) = −1 he/she contributes with −1/p(t) for the supply where p(t)
is the price of the cost transaction. The total demand and supply are given by
D = N+A(t)
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and S = N−A(t)
2p(t)
units of assets respectively. Then following the
paper [6], let’s fix the price p(t + 1) in such a way that the demand matches
the supply, i.e.,
p(t+ 1) = p(t)
N + A(t)
N −A(t)
(1)
Let’s discuss how the market payoff is defined. To reward someone for their
decisions we need to wait at least two successive transactions. For example, if
one buys a stock for the price p(t) only later, at time t′ when the price will
be p(t′), we are able to know if buying was profitable. So the market payoff
has an inter-temporal nature which depends at least on two prices. We can
consider for agent i the capital Ci(t) =Mi(t) + p(t)Si(t), which quantifies the
agent wealth at each time step. This quantity depends on the the amount of
money Mi(t) and asset Si(t) which she/he owns at time t, and the current
price p(t).
Suppose the agent i decides to buy stocks ai(t) = 1 at price p(t + 1), so the
position changes to M(t + 1) = M(t) − 1 and S(t + 1) = S(t) + 1/p(t + 1).
Alternatively, if the decision was to sell stocks, so M(t + 1) = M(t) + p(t +
1)/p(t) and S(t + 1) = S(t) − 1/p(t). In a compact way, we can express the
same result as
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M(t + 1)=M(t)− a(t)
N − a(t)A(t)
N −A(t)
(2)
S(t+ 1)=S(t) +
a(t)
p(t+ 1)
N − a(t)A(t)
N −A(t)
(3)
After a simple algebra we obtain the capital increment,
C(t+ 1)− C(t) = [p(t+ 1)− p(t)]S(t) (4)
which means that there is no gain from a single transaction apart from capital
gain. Then gain is due to a price changing. Now consider that ai(t+1) = −ai(t).
This results in:
M(t + 2)=M(t)− a(t)
N − a(t)A(t)
N −A(t)
+ a(t)
N + a(t)A(t+ 1)
N − A(t+ 1)
(5)
S(t+ 2)=S(t) +
a(t)
p(t+ 1)
N − a(t)A(t)
N −A(t)
−
a(t)
p(t + 2)
N + a(t)A(t + 1)
N − A(t+ 1)
(6)
The capital will be update by
C(t+ 2) = C(t) + [p(t + 2)− p(t)]S(t) +Q(t + 1)R(t)
A(t+ 1)a(t)
N
(7)
where
R(t) =
1− a(t)A(t)/N
1− A(t)/N
and Q(t+ 1) =
2
1 + A(t+ 1)/N
(8)
are constants of order 1 if A(t), A(t+ 1)≪ N .
Note that in Eq. (7) the first term corresponds to the capital gain. From the
second term we derive the payoff update
u$i (t+ 1)− u
$
i (t) = ai(t)A(t + 1) (9)
as proposed by Andersen, et.al [3]. Previously, Giardina, et. al [18] proposed
a quite similar payoff function on their models. Ref. [6] observes that, at time
t the agent doesn’t know the excess demand A(t + 1). However he/she may
resort to the expectation given by the operator Ei[∆ui|t] to evaluate the best
decision to make on time t. Assuming that
Ei[A(t + 1)|t] = −φiA(t) (10)
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where linearity is assumed for the sake of simplicity, the expected payoffs
increment ∆ui(t+ 2) of agent i is
Ei[∆ui(t + 2)|t] = Ei[ai(t)A(t+ 1)|t] = −φiai(t)A(t) (11)
The stationary state can only occur when the expectation is consistently val-
idated by the dynamics as show in [6], i.e., when
φi ≃ −
〈A(t+ 1)A(t)〉
〈A2(t)〉
(12)
for all i. If φi > 0 the agent i believes that the price fluctuates around some
equilibrium (fundamental) values pf . This trader is called fundamentalist and
as we can see in the Eq. (11) she/he plays as a Minority Game (<) player for
whom the payoff is
u<i (t+ 1)− u
<
i (t) = −ai(t)A(t). (13)
On the contrary, if the agent believes that the price is following a trend, a
movement A(t) will likely be followed by fluctuations of the same sign, i.e,
φi < 0. These agents, called chartists, play like in a Majority Game (>) and
the payoff is just
u>i (t+ 1)− u
>
i (t) = ai(t)A(t). (14)
Whether $-Game is approximate by Minority Game or Majority Game de-
pends on the sign of 〈A(t + 1)A(t)〉. We shall use the superscript <,>, $ in
the following to differentiate the results found in the different models.
3 Single Time Models
In this section we will discuss three agent models that simulate different
trader’s behaviors and interactions in the stock exchange market. The set up
are the same for all models, differing only by the payoff function that ranks
their strategies. In a generic description, consider N odd agents that buy or
sell stocks, goods, currencies, etc..., to profit from the market price fluctu-
ation. Suppose t is a discrete time. Each trader is endowed by S quenched
strategies randomly generated at the beginning. To each strategy each trader
attaches a score ui,s(t) which she/he updates in the course of time. At each
time t, she/he undertakes the action recommended by the highest scored strat-
egy s∗i = argmaxs ui,s. The action a
µ(t)
i,s∗ (t) taken by agent i also depend on
the value µ(t) of a public information variable. After that, all these orders
are collected to compose the excess demand A(t) =
∑N
i=1 a
µ(t)
i,s∗
i
(t). Finally all
agents update all the payoff function ui,s according to Eq. (9), (13) or (14)
respectively for $-Game, Minority Game or Majority Game. The information
µ(t) is updated according to the outcome A(t) of the market:
µ(t+ 1) =


2µ(t) + 1 mod P if A(t) > 0
2µ(t) mod P if A(t) < 0
(15)
Note that A(t) = 0 never occur when N is odd. In this way µ(t) encodes in its
binary representation the signs of the last m outcomes A(t− k) k = 1, ..., m
of the market. Graphically Eq. (15) describes a processes on the so called de-
Bruijn graph. This is a directed graph of 2m nodes with directed links from
nodes k to nodes 2k + 1 mod P and 2k mod P [7].
To fix notation, we denote a temporal average of a given time dependent
quantity W (t) as
〈W 〉 = lim
T→∞
1
T − Teq
T∑
t=Teq
W (t). (16)
If we decompose this quantity into a conditional average on histories, we
rewrite as
〈W |µ〉 = lim
T→∞
∑T
t=Teq W (t)δµ(t),µ∑T
t=Teq δµ(t),µ
(17)
Finally the average on the realization is denoted by
W¯ =
1
nr
nr∑
i
〈Wi〉 (18)
where nr is the number of realization. The main free parameter to study the
stationary state of the system is α = P
N
(see [8]). Let us now analyze the
behavior of the different models. The autocorrelation is the key to explain
the others quantities for single models and to understand the trader behavior.
In the Fig. 1 the autocorrelation of the global action A(t) for the Minority
Game is plotted as a function of α for memory m = 5. All runs were equi-
librated for Teq = 15000 times steps and run for 30000 times steps. We fix
attention to the case of agents with S = 2 strategies. For the Minority Game
the autocorrelation is zero for α much large than the critical point αc and the
global performance is similar to the random game. This happens because the
number of players is small compared with the amount of information available
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in the market (for a discussion of Minority Game behavior see Ref. [8]. In-
creasing the number of traders, globally they start to exploit the information
and coordinate their action until the occurrence of a phase transition. Intrinsi-
cally minority players have a non imitative behavior, thus the autocorrelation
becomes negative below the critical point. Conversely, the majority players
are trend follower and they induce a positive autocorrelation in A(t), see Fig.
1. What can we expect for $-Game? Fig. 1 shows that the $-Game is char-
acterized by a positive autocorrelation 〈A(t)A(t + 1)〉. Hence we expect(see
Eq. (12)) that the $-Game behaves in a way which is similar to the Majority
Game. Fig. 2 supports this conclusion by comparing, for the different models,
the behavior of σ2 given by
σ2 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
〈A(t)2〉. (19)
If you consider that A(t) persist to be positive for some period. All those
strategies si ∈ S that is playing with ai = 1 will be reinforce due to the payoff
∆ui(t + 1) = ai(t)A(t + 1). Conversely, all those strategies with ai = −1 will
be weakened. The collective tendency of the traders is to reach a regime where
they play with the same strategy. It is very similar to what happens for MJ-
Model (for more details discussion of this models, see Ref. [11]). The $-players
persist to be in a majority group keeping the same strategy for long. The Fig.
3, exhibits these results clearly by reporting the self-overlap Q given by:
Q =
1
N
N∑
i=1
〈si〉2. (20)
This is a measure of the average fluctuation in the strategy choice. The strate-
gies are labelled by si = ±1, thus when Q = 1 it means that the players are
frozen, i.e they always use the same strategy. This is what we observe in the
MJ-Model. Fig. 3 shows that this happens also in $-Game-Model showing that
it is modelling a similar market mechanism. On the contrary in the Minority
Game we observe Q < 1 which means that the players are changing the strate-
gies frequently. As a consequence of this, the returns in the Minority Game
are not predictable. This is measured by the quantity H called predictability
which is computed as
H =
1
N
P∑
µ
ρµ〈A|µ〉2. (21)
where ρµ is the probability that µ(t) = µ. In Fig. 5 we observe that the
predictability H is zero when Q starts to decrease. It is known that for the
Minority Game the existence of a phase transition for αc ≈ 0.34 and the
region where H = 0 is called symmetric phase [10]. Observe that H = 0
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implies 〈A|µ〉 = 0 for all µ. In this regime is not possible to predict the
minority group based on the public information µ(t), this property is known
by economist as no arbitrage. For the other models (MJ and $-Game) H > 0
for all value of α, that results from the fact that 〈A|µ〉 6= 0 for some value
of µ. Of course, when the strategy of the agents are frozen the game become
predictable.
In Fig. 4, we examine the entropy for all these models given by
S = −
1
N
P∑
µ
ρµ logP (ρ
µ). (22)
Note that S was normalized to be in the interval ∈ [0, 1]. This quantity help us
to analyze the dynamics of information µ(t) in the De-Bruijn graph. The MG
dynamics visits all nodes in the graph more or less uniformly. Hence ρµ ≈ 1
P
and S is closed to one. In both the Majority Game and the $-Game we find
that S is smaller, this means that only few vertices are visited. The $-Game
and MJ have a dynamics restricted to some subgraph, i.e., only a subset of
vertices µ(t) ∈ {0, ..., P − 1} are visited in the stationary regime, resulting in
a small value of the entropy S.
4 Two Times Models
Let us consider now the models whose dynamics takes place over two time
steps. Any particular agent first decides which action to take (buy/sell) at time
t – according to his/her currently best strategy s∗i – then takes the opposite
action at time t+1 and finally evaluates the results according to Eq. (9), (13)
or (14) depending on whether he/she behaves according to the $, minority or
majority game respectively. If all agents behave synchronously, we just have
that A(t+1) = −A(t) and it is clear that the $-Game payoffs become exactly
identical to MG payoffs. Therefore the $-Game becomes identical with the
MG.
The non-trivial case is when agents act non-synchronously. This means that
we can classify agents into two groups, one of which takes decisions on even
times and evaluates the outcome on odd times and the other which does the
opposite. Our previous argument suggests that when one group is much larger
than the other, then A(t+1) ≈ −A(t) and the game’s behavior becomes that
of the MG. For this reason, we consider extreme case of equally sized groups.
More precisely, we divide the set of agents into two sets G+1 and G−1 of N/2
agents 1 , and postulate that, at time t, group G(−1)t takes a fresh decision
1 Now N is even. Concerning Eq. (15) when A(t) = 0 we set µ(t + 1) = 2µ(t)
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whereas the group G−(−1)t reacts, i.e. takes an action which is just the opposite
of the one they undertook in the previous time step.
The interaction takes place again through the total excess demand A(t) which
has now two contributions from the two groups:
A(t) = B(t) +R(t), B(t) =
∑
i∈G(−1)t
a
µ(t)
i,s∗
i
, R(t) = −B(t− 1) (23)
where we introduced a different notation for the contribution (B) of the acting
group and for that (R) of the reacting one.
We will first considering how agents using the different scoring rules (9, 13)
and (14) behave when they interact among themselves. Then we shall study
the behavior of $-players when they are put in interaction with minority or
majority players in a mixed population.
4.1 Single population
We analyze the situation where each agent in each of the two different groups
of traders is endowed with a set of S = 2 strategies which are randomly drawn
at the beginning.
The numerical analysis reveals that i) the behavior of a pure population of
either minority or majority players is equivalent to that observed for a single
times models ii) the behavior of the $-Game is similar to that of the MG.
For example, the volatility σ2/N shows (see Fig. 7) the typical minimum for
the MG whereas it steadily increases as α decreases in the case of majority
players. In Fig 8 we see that most players get frozen (Q ≈ 1) for MJ while the
choice of the strategies remains fickle (0 < Q$,< < 0.6) for minority players, in
agreement with the behavior of the corresponding single time models. In the
case of $-players, both quantities (σ2 and Q) show a behavior similar to that
of the MG. The same is true for the entropy S, as shown in Fig. 9.
Indeed, for all models analyzed here, the autocorrelation of A(t) is negative,
as shown in Fig 6. This is a consequence of the alternating behavior of agents.
In fact the main contribution is due to the term 〈A(t)A(t + 1)〉 ≃ −〈B2(t)〉
(notice that 〈A(t)A(t+ 1)〉 has the same behavior as −σ2).
The only difference between $-Game and MG appears in the behavior of H .
Fig. 10 shows that H vanishes when α < 0.4 in a population of minority
players (because 〈B|µ〉 ≃ −〈R|µ〉) whereas H increases for majority players
mod P or µ(t+ 1) = 2µ(t) + 1 mod P at random, with equal probability.
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(and 〈B|µ〉 ∝ 〈R|µ〉). This is in line with the behavior of single time models.
The behavior of H for the $-Game closely matches that of the MG for α > 0.4
but it diverges from it when α < 0.4. This is a consequence of the fact that
while 〈B|µ〉 ≃ −〈R|µ〉, (with 〈B|µ〉 6= 0) in the MG, we find that 〈B|µ〉 and
〈R|µ〉 are uncorrelated in the $-Game. It is remarkable that when the process
µ(t) of Eq. (15) is replaced by random draw, as in Ref. [14], the predictability
H of the two models coincides. This is because then 〈B|µ〉 ≃ 0 for all µ when
α is small.
4.2 Mixed population
In order to test further the behavior of $-game players, let us consider how they
interact with minority or majority players in a mixed population. Specifically
we split each of the two groups G±1 = G±1,a∪G±1,b in two equal sizes (now N
is a multiple of 4). Here a and b label the type of players in the sub-group. So
for example G±1 = G±1,$ ∪ G±1,< denotes the case where a population of $-
players interacts with a population of minority players. Again the interaction
is on two times, but now we have two contributions to B(t) and R(t) from the
two sub-populations.
We have studied interaction of $-players with minority or majority players (i.e.
a = $ and b =< or >). The mixed Minority-Majority model was studied by De
Martino, et.al [9]. We found that the autocorrelation is always negative in both
cases (see Fig. 11). In the case b =<, we find again that the autocorrelation
is proportional to −σ2. However contrary to the single population case, we
find that when α decreases the volatility σ2 decreases (at least down to α =
0.1, see of Fig. 12). On the contrary σ2 increases as α decreases when $-
players interact with majority players (see inset of Fig. 12). This suggests
that collective behavior is dominated by the sub-population of minority or
majority players. This is confirmed by the behavior of H in Fig. 13, even
though it appears that the presence of $-players removes the phase transition
(or shifts it at least to α < 0.1). This is more clearly evident in the behavior
of Q in the inset of Fig. 15. When interacting with majority type players,
$-players also get frozen (Q ≈ 1). But also the presence of $-players makes
minority players much less fickle (Q ≈ 0.8). Hence $-players increase the
efficiency of coordination of the minority players.
In order to compare the performance of agents of different types, we give the
same set of strategies to the two sub-groups a and b. In particular we define
the overlap
Oa,b =
1
N
∑
〈sai 〉〈s
b
i〉 (24)
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between types a and b. When O = 1 (O = −1) the two types of agents behave
exactly in the same (opposite) way, whereas O ≈ 0 implies that agents of
the two types behave in an uncorrelated way. Fig. 15 shows that $-players
behave in a way which is more or less uncorrelated with majority players. On
the contrary they display an anti-imitative behavior when interacting with
minority players. It seems indeed reasonable that when minority game type of
interaction prevails, as shown by the fact that the autocorrelation of A(t) is
negative (see Fig. 11), two agents with the same strategies would benefit from
playing in different ways.
Therefore we conclude that on one hand the collective behavior of a mixed
population “imitates” the behavior of the population with which the $-player
sub-population is interacting with. But at the microscopic level, the behavior
of $-players tend to be loosely or negatively correlated with that of players of
the other type.
5 Conclusions
The $-Game model reproduces the main statistical features observed for Ma-
jority Game whenever we consider a single times transaction. The $-traders
freeze on the best strategy since the payoff reinforces an imitative behavior
as seen from the positive autocorrelation of the excess of demand A(t). When
we take into account the inter-temporal nature of the transaction, we force
all traders to react after all the transactions. To do so, we proposed a model
where two populations interact over two time steps, taking decisions at dif-
ferent moments, out of phase. For two interacting homogeneous populations
we saw that, when traders are all of minority or majority type, the same be-
havior as in single time models obtains. A population of $-traders shows an
anti-imitative trend in the choices of strategies behaving as Minority Game
players. Whatever the type of traders, the autocorrelation function of the ex-
cess demand turns out to be negative implying that the market interaction is
similar to that of the minority game.
Also in the mixed composed population, the market interaction is of minority
type, as shown by the autocorrelation of the excess demand. The collective
behavior with $-traders interacting with a population of minority or majority
traders is similar to that of the latter population.
In conclusion, we find that the $-Game model exhibits a set of new features
and it poses several new and challenging questions.
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The MJ- and $- models are plotted in the main graph.
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Fig. 3. Self-overlap (Q)of the strategies choose by plays during the game. $-traders
and MJ-traders are frozen in the stationary regime Q ≈ 1. The choice of the strate-
gies remain fickle for MG-players 0.2 < Q < 0.7 when α < 0.35
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Fig. 4. Entropy (S) of visited state. This quantity is computing the dynamics of the
information µ(t) for each analyzed model, in the case of single transaction
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Fig. 5. Predictability H (of the return A(t) given the information µ). Both MJ-
and $- models are predictable. It is due to the frozen strategies Q ≈ 1 that leads a
quasi-deterministic dynamics in information space µ(t) (S is very small).
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Fig. 6. Autocorrelation of A(t) given by (23). The negative sign is due to the inter-
action between populations. We denote by MG-MG, $-$ and MJ-MJ the interaction
between two homogenous population composed respectively by MG, $ and MJ. In
the small box is shown the autocorrelation for MJ-MJ model.
0
1
2
3
4
5
0.1 1 10
σ
2
α
Mg-Mg
$-$
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
0.1 1 10
σ
2
α
Mj-Mj
Fig. 7. Volatility in the case of two times models. The $-$ fluctuate more than
MG-MG in the subcritical regime just because the amplitude of the excess demand
for $-players is higher than MG-players.
16
00.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
0.1 1 10
Q
α
Mg-Mg
Mj-Mj
$-$
Fig. 8. The self-overlap for two times models in the homogeneous case. Note that
this quantity for MJ-MJ remain the same Q ≈ 1. Now the $-players choose the
strategy similarly to that observed for MG-players.
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Fig. 9. Entropy for homogeneous interacting populations. The $-$ model reproduce
the same dynamics in the information space as observed for MG-MG model.
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Fig. 10. The predictability H for $-$ model quite similar for MG-MG model when
α > 0.4, but it differs quantitatively for α < 0.4, due to the high autocorrelation in
the reaction term R(t).
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Fig. 11. The autocorrelation of A(t) for $-majority model is shown in the small
box (line). The autocorrelation for $-MG interaction approximated to zero when N
increase.
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Fig. 12. The volatility σ2 for mixed population in the two times models. The $-MG
model decrease the fluctuation of the excess demand A(t) when N increase.
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Fig. 13. Predictability H for a mixed interacting population in the two times models.
Note that the sign of A(t) become unpredictable H ≈ 0 for $-MG model when α
approximate to 0.1.
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Fig. 14. The entropy S show that the dynamics of information for mixed population
($-MG and $-MJ) are qualitatively similar to that observed for MG and MJ (single
times models)
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Fig. 15. The small box exhibits the self-overlap of the choice of strategies for one
fixed subpopulation. The results remains the same for all sub-population. The quan-
tity denoted by O is computing the overlapping of the strategy used by $-agents
belonging to different sub-population with the same population. The $-traders are
anti-imitative in relation to MG and imitative when interact with MJ.
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